We propose the use of data transformations as a defense against evasion attacks on ML classifiers. We present and investigate strategies for incorporating a variety of data transformations including dimensionality reduction via Principal Component Analysis to enhance the resilience of machine learning, targeting both the classification and the training phase. We empirically evaluate and demonstrate the feasibility of linear transformations of data as a defense mechanism against evasion attacks using multiple real-world datasets. Our key findings are that the defense is (i) effective against the best known evasion attacks from the literature, resulting in a two-fold increase in the resources required by a white-box adversary with knowledge of the defense for a successful attack, (ii) applicable across a range of ML classifiers, including Support Vector Machines and Deep Neural Networks, and (iii) generalizable to multiple application domains, including image classification and human activity classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Starting in the early 2000s, there has been a considerable body of work [6] , [2] , [9] exposing the vulnerability of machine learning algorithms to strategic adversaries. We focus on evasion attacks [3] , [14] , [17] , which aim to fool existing ML classifiers trained on benign data by adding strategic perturbations to test inputs. Evasion attacks have been proposed for a variety of machine learning classifiers such as Support Vector Machines [3] , [13] , tree-based classifiers [13] , [7] such as random forests and boosted trees and more recently for neural networks [5] , [17] , [14] , [8] , [4] , [12] .
Contributions: We propose and thoroughly investigate the use of linear transformations of data as a defense against evasion attacks. We consider powerful adversaries with knowledge of our defenses when evaluating their effectiveness and find that they demonstrably reduce the success of evasion attacks. To the best of our knowledge, ours are the only defenses against evasion attacks with the following properties: (1) applicability across multiple ML classifiers (such as SVMs, DNNs), (2) applicability in varied application domains (image and activity classification), and (3) mitigation of multiple attack types, including strategic ones. Further, the tunability of our defense allows a system designer to pick appropriate operating points on the utility-security tradeoff curve.
Defense: We propose the use of data transformations as a defense mechanism. Specifically, we consider linear dimensionality reduction techniques such as Principal Component Analysis which aim to project high-dimensional data to a lower-dimensional space while preserving the most useful variance of the data [16] , [18] . We present and investigate a strategy for incorporating dimensionality reduction and other linear transformations of data to enhance the resilience of machine learning, targeting both the classification and training phases. Data transformations are applied to the training data to enhance the resilience of the trained classifier and they significantly change the learned classifier. Linear data transformations are a generalization of regularization methods. They allow us to access novel and otherwise inaccessible robustnessperformance tradeoffs.
Empirical Evaluation: We empirically demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our defenses using: i) multiple ML classifiers, such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and Deep Neural Networks (DNNs); ii) state-of-the-art evasion attacks on Linear SVMs from Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. [11] , and on deep neural networks from Carlini et al. [4] , as well as modifications of these attacks targeting our defense; iii) a variety of real-world datasets/applications: the MNIST image dataset [10] and the UCI Human Activity Recognition (HAR) dataset [1] . Our key findings are that even in the face of a white-box adversary with complete knowledge of the ML system:
• Security: the defense leads to increases of up to 5⇥ in the degree of modification required for a successful attack and equivalently, reduces adversarial success rates by around 2 50⇥ at fixed levels of perturbation. • Generality: the defense can be used for different ML classifiers (and application domains) with minimal modification of the original classifiers, while still being effective at combating adversarial examples. • Utility: there is a modest utility loss of about 0.5-2% in the classification success on benign samples.
II. DATA TRANSFORMATIONS AS A DEFENSE
The dimension of the data is d and the training data is a d ⇥ n matrix X, so each example is a column. We assume the data is centered, i.e. X1 = 0 where 1 2 R n is the vector of all ones and 0 2 R d is the vector of all zeros. The set of data classes is C and the classifier in use is f : R d ! C. An adversarial example is denotedx. The additional inputs to Algorithm 1 are:
• Select: The algorithm used to select a linear transformation of the data based on some properties of the data, e.g. Select = TopPrincipalComponents(k). • Train: This is the algorithm used to train classifiers of the desired class. In general, this will be a specialization of more general training algorithm to specific parameters.
A. Effect on Support Vector Machines
To motivate Algorithm 1, we briefly describe the case where
Train produces a linear classifier by learning a support vector machine. Learning an SVM [15] that can classify data points from two classes, y i 2 { 1, 1}, involves finding an affine function f (x) = w T x+b that minimizes a loss function with a quadratic regularization term: w T w. If we use Algorithm 1 and apply an invertible linear transformation B to the training data, we will learn some alternative function g aux (x) = u T x + b 0 . Our actual classifier will be g(x) = g aux (Bx) = u T Bx + b 0 . It can be shown that selecting the u that minimizes loss on the transformed data is equivalent to directly selecting the value of w = Bx that minimizes a loss function with the regularization term w T (BB T ) 1 w. Thus applying an invertible linear transformation to the data is equivalent to modifying the quadratic form that appears in the regularization term of the SVM loss function. A non-invertible linear transformation is equivalent to modifying the regularization term and forcing the weight vector w to come from a particular subspace.
Regularization: A standard generalization of the SVM loss function multiplies the regularization term w T w by a parameter . This corresponds to the simplest possible linear transformation of the data: multiplication by a constant. Explicitly, we have B = 1 p I. Thus, ordinary regularization of SVMs fits neatly into this framework. However, more general linear transformations provide us with significantly more flexibility to modify the regularization constraint and allow us to access novel and otherwise inaccessible robustnessperformance tradeoffs.
B. Defense using PCA
Several of the choices of Select that we will use in Algorithm 1 are based on Principal Component Analysis. PCA [16] is a linear transformation of the data that identifies so-called 'principal axes' in the space of the data, which are the directions in which the data has maximum variance, and projects the original data along these axes.
Let the data samples be column vectors x i 2 R d for i 2 {1, . . . , n}, let X be the d ⇥ n matrix of centered data samples. The principal components of X are the normalized eigenvectors of its sample covariance matrix C = XX T . More precisely, because C is positive semidefinite, there is a decomposition C = U⇤U T where U is an orthogonal matrix, ⇤ = diag( 1 , . . . , d ), and 1 . .
X is a data sample represented in the principal component basis. Let X k be the projection of the sample data in the k-dimensional subspace spanned by the k largest principal components. Thus 
C. Intuition behind the PCA defense
We will give some intuition about why dimensionality reduction should improve resilience for SVMs. We discuss the two-class case for simplicity, but the ideas generalize to the multiple class case. The core of a linear classifier is a function g(x) = w T
x + b. Both x and w can be expressed in the principal component basis as U T
x and U T w. We expect that many of the principal components with the largest coefficients in the weight vector, |(U T w) i |, to correspond to small eigenvalues i .
The reason is simple: in order for different principal components to achieve the same level of influence on the classifier output, |(U T w) i | must be proportional to 1/ p i . To take advantage of the information in a component with small variation, the classifier must use a large coefficient. The principal components vary in their usefulness for classification, but among the components that are useful we expect a general trend of decreasing coefficients (U T w) i as p i increases. Figure 1 validates this prediction. Many of the principal components with very low variances have large coefficients in w. As variance increases, the coefficients tend to decrease. The exception to the trend is the first principal component, but this is not surprising. The first principal component, visible on the top right in the plot, is by far the most useful source of classification information because it is strongly aligned with the difference of the class means. Consequently it does not fit the overall trend and actually has the largest coefficient. However, among the other components, there is a mixture of cross-class and in-class variation and the trend holds.
Effect on robustness: Since the optimal attack perturbation for a linear classifier is a multiple of w, the principal components with large coefficients are the ones that the attacker takes advantage of. The defense denies this opportunity to the attacker by forcing the classifier to assign no weight to the low variance components. This significantly changes the resulting w that the classifier learns. The classifier loses access to some information, but accessing that information required large weight coefficients, so the attacker is hurt far more. Thus, by using only high variance components, the classifier gains significant adversarial robustness for the loss of a small amount of classification performance.
D. Neural networks
Neural networks are more complicated due to the nonuniqueness of local minima in the associated loss function and the larger variety of regularization methods that are employed. At first glance, it may seem that adding a linear layer as the first layer of a neural network may provide the same benefits as PCA-based dimensionality reduction. However, the training process does not optimize for robustness, so in practice the linear layer that is learned does not have the desired effect, unlike in our defense where the linear layer weights are separately specified using PCA. Thus, the intution for the effectiveness of linear transformations carries over from the case of Linear SVMs: the adversary loses access to dimensions which aid in the creation of adversarial samples while the classifier remains largely unaffected since most of the information required for classification is retained. Further, in our empirical results in Section III, it is clear that the average distance to the boundary of the classifier increases when the linear transformation is added, thus leading to robustness.
E. Attacks against the linear transformation defense
Both for linear classifiers and neural networks, the classifier learned using our defense lies in the same family as the classifier that would be learned without the defense. Thus, simple modifications of existing attacks give the white-box versions of attacks against the classifier with the defense.
Due to the inclusion of a linear transformation of the data, the overall classifier is f (x) = f aux (Bx). In the white-box setting, since the adversary is aware of the exact parameters of the classifier produced by the defense, attacks are carried out with respect to the overall classifier. For the optimal attack on Linear SVMs, a similar change is made, where each w i (the output of the SVM optimization) is replaced by B T w i , since that is the term which acts on the input x. Thus, the adversarial sample now isx
In the case of the optimization based attack on neural networks, the optimization objective remains the same, with a change in the classifier the loss function is computed over:
In our experiments, we first compute the linear transformation matrix, and then add it as a linear layer after the input layer of the neural network.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present an overview of our empirical results. Our evaluation results confirm the effectiveness of our defense in a variety of scenarios, each of which has a different combination of datasets, learning algorithms and attacks used against the defense. For each set of evaluations, we vary a particular step of the classification pipeline and fix the others. Our results are summarized in Table I .
Baseline configuration: We start by considering a classification pipeline with the MNIST dataset as input data, a Linear SVM as our classification algorithm and PCA as the linear transformation used in our defense. Since we consider the Linear SVM as our classifier, we evaluate its susceptibility to adversarial samples generated using the optimal attack on linear classifiers. We evaluate our defenses on adversarial samples created starting from the test set for each dataset. Note that in all of the plots showing the effectiveness of our defense, the legend key 'None' denotes adversarial success for a classifier without any defense. Figure 2 shows the variation in adversarial success for the defense against the optimal attack on Linear SVMs. This plot corresponds to the case where the adversary is aware of the dimensionality reduction defense and inputs a sample to the pipeline which is designed to optimally evade the reduced dimension classifier. At a perturbation magnitude of 0.5, where the classifier with no defenses has a misclassification rate of 99.04%, the reduced dimension classifier with k = 80 has a misclassification rate of just 19.75%, which represents a 80.25% or 5.01⇥ decrease in the adversarial success rates. At an adversarial budget of 1.3, the misclassification rate for the classifier with no defenses is 100%, while it is about 66.7% for the classifier with a reduced dimension of 40. TABLE I  ROBUSTNESS IMPROVEMENT AT A MISCLASSIFICATION RATE OF 60%. THE TABLE ALSO GIVES THE ACCURACY REDUCTION FOR We can also study the effect of our defense on the adversarial budget required to achieve a certain adversarial success rate. A budget of 0.3 is required to achieve a 86.6% misclassification without the defense, while the required budget for a classifier with a defense with k = 40 is 1.75, which is a 5.83⇥ increase. The corresponding numbers to achieve a 98% misclassification rate are 0.5 without the defense and 2.5 with, which represents a 5⇥ increase. The presence of the defense forces the adversary to add much larger perturbations to achieve the same misclassification rates. Thus, our defense clearly reduces the effectiveness of an attack carried out by a powerful adversary with full knowledge of the defense and the classifier as well as the ability to carry out optimal attacks.
A. Effect of defense on Support Vector Machines

B. Effect of defense on neural networks
We now modify the baseline configuration by changing the classifier used to FC100-100-10, a fully connected neural network with two hidden layers of 100 neurons with ReLU activations. We continue to use the MNIST dataset and PCA as the linear transformation. We use Carlini and Wagner's [4] `2 constrained attack to find untargeted adversarial samples, i.e. the closest possiblex in terms of the`2 norm. Since this attack returns the minimal possible perturbation for each sample, in Figure 4 we plot the CDF of the minimal perturbations found by the attack over the test set in order to compare using the same metric as the other results.
We repeated the attack on neural networks enhanced using our PCA-based defense. The attack was carried out on the composite classifier, thus representing the white box setting.
In this case, we see that at kx xk = 1.0 the adversarial success falls to 29.5% using the defense with k = 40, which represents a drop of 35.5% or 2.2⇥. At a larger allowed budget of 1.5, the fall is 26.4% or 1.4⇥ to 63.8%. Further, the budget required to achieve a misclassification rate of 90% increases from 1.5 to 2.16, which is a 1.44⇥ increase. Figure 3 shows the tradeoff between performance for Linear SVMs under ordinary and adversarial conditions. The kink in the tradeoff for the MNIST dataset is clearly between 80 and 60. There is little benefit in classification performance by using more dimensions, and essentially no benefit in robustness by using fewer. At k = 80, we see a drop in classification success on the test set from 91.5% without any defenses, to 90.64% with the defense. There is a modest utility loss of about 1.2% at this value of k, as compared to a security gain of 5.9⇥.
C. Effect of PCA-based defense on utility
The last column of Table I presents the effect of our defense on the classification accuracy of benign data. The key takeaway is that the decrease in accuracy for both neural networks and Linear SVMs for reduced dimensions down to k = 40 is around 1-2%. More aggressive dimensionality reduction can lead to steep drops in classification accuracy since much of the information used for classification is lost.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that the use of linear transformations reduces adversarial success rates at fixed budgets even against state-of-the-art attack. While our defense does not completely solve the problem of evasion attacks, its classifier and datasetagnostic nature enables it to be used in conjunction with other defenses such as adversarial training in order to make adversarial success rates negligible. We will explore the synergy of our defense with other techniques in future work. We hope that our work inspires further research in combating the problem of evasion attacks and securing machine learning based systems.
APPENDIX Table I includes some attacks not described in the main body of the paper.
1) Gradient based attacks on neural networks: The Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) attack is an efficient attack against neural networks introduced in [5] . This attack is for the`1 metric. Adversarial examples are generated by adding adversarial noise proportional to the sign of the gradient of the loss function J(x, y, ✓). Here, x is the example, y is the true class, and ✓ is the network weight parameters. Concretely,
The parameter ⌘ controls the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation, similar to ✏ for the attack on Linear SVMs: 
For the FG attack, ✏ is the`2 norm of the perturbation.
2) Classifier mismatch attacks: In this setting, the adversary trains a classifierf that mimics the original classifier f , but is not aware of the defense. We assume the adversary is able to trainf such that it perfectly matches f trained on the original data without any linear transformations. The adversarial samples are thus generated with respect tof = Train(X), and not with respect to the true classifier f = (x 7 ! (Train(BX)(x)). Equivalently, this setting corresponds to the adversary using Algorithm 1 with the true training examples X, the true training function Train, but with a different choice of Select. The adversary does not know the true Select function, so they use a trivial version that always returns I.
3) Architecture mismatch attacks: In this setting, the adversary trains a classifierf using a choice of Train that does not match that used to produce f . Thusf is not only a different function from f , but it may come from a different family of classifiers. For example, f may be a three layer neural network andf may be a five layer neural network. As in the classifier mismatch setting, the adversary is not aware of the defense used (the choice of Select).
The classifier and architecture mismatch attack settings are interesting to consider since the problem of the transferability of adversarial samples [13] is still an open research question. Our results in these settings demonstrate that a defense using linear transformations can mitigate the threat posed by transferability.
